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I. INTRODUCTION 
The cast of characters in the conflict of laws have curwus 
names-renvoi, depec;age, false conflicts, true conflicts, 
comparative impairment, choice-influencing considerations. This 
Article concerns one of the strangest: the unprovided-for case. The 
unprovided-for case is a puzzle that arises, primarily concerning 
tort cases, under the dominant choice-of-law approach used in the 
United States, governmental interest analysis. As its name 
suggests, in the unprovided-for case the tort law of no jurisdiction 
appears to apply. There is a gap in the law. 
One might think that the solution is simple. When a court faces 
a gap in the law, it looks to relevant regulatory policies and creates 
a legal rule to fill the gap. But this is not how interest analysts 
have tried to solve the unprovided-for case. It is a fundamental 
commitment among conflicts scholars of all stripes that law is 
applied in conflicts cases. It is not made.! For the unprovided-for 
case to be solved, preexisting law must be found to fill the gap that 
the unprovided-for case apparently presents. 
The most influential argument along these lines was offered by 
Larry Kramer, in his 1989 article The Myth of the "Unprovided-
For" Case. 2 Kramer's solution has not only been largely accepted 
by interest analysts,3 it also appears to have silenced critics. 
1 But see infra note 126 (discussing briefly some conflicts scholars wh<i characterize 
courts as making law in conflicts cases). 
2 75 VA. L. REV. 1045. 
3 Kermit Roosevelt-the Reporter for the new Third Restatement of the Conflict of 
Laws-is a prominent example of an interest analyst who accepts Kramer's argument, 
although he disagrees about the effect that the Privileges and Immunities Clause, U.S. 
CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl.1, has on (putative) unprovided-for cases. Kermit Roosevelt III, The 
Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2448, 2520-25 (1999). See 
infra note 78. For other examples of conflicts scholars who accept Kramer's argument 
(although not always his claims about the effect of the Clause), see Mark D. Rosen, Choice-
of-Law as Non-Constitutional Federal Law, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1017, 1082 (2015) (stating 
that Kramer's argument is "irrefutably sound"); Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Vicissitudes of 
Choice of Law: The Restatement (First, Second) and Interest Analysis, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 
347--49 (1997) (accepting Kramer's argument); Herma Hill Kay, A Defense of Currie's 
Governmental Interest Analysis, in 215 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 161-64 (1989) (same). But 
see Louise Weinberg, A Radically Transformed Restatement for Conflicts, 2015 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1999, 2009-10 n.37 (rejecting Kramer's argument, although not for the reasons I offer 
in this Article). 
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I will argue that Kramer's solution fails. He finds applicable 
laws in unprovided-for cases only by using an unsustainably broad 
definition of a law, a definition that generates intractable puzzles 
if consistently employed. What Kramer actually shows is not that 
law always applies in the unprovided-for case, but that regulatory 
policies can always be found to recommend law to fill the gap that 
the unprovided-for case creates. But these policies are reasons for 
laws. They are not themselves laws. 
The recognition that law must be made in the unprovided-for 
case is much more than a solution to a technical problem in the 
interest analysis approach. It revolutionizes the entire field. Once 
it is acknowledged that a court makes law in the unprovided-for 
case by taking into account freestanding regulatory policies, one 
cannot avoid the conclusion that it must do the same in every 
conflicts case, for these policies are relevant to them too.4 The 
result is that interest analysis collapses, leaving no clear 
replacement. Or so I shall argue. 
II. SOME BACKGROUND 
Two main conflicts approaches are used in the United States. 
The oldest is vested rights theory. 
A. VESTED RIGHTS THEORY 
Vested rights theory is best exemplified in the First 
Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, for which the Harvard law 
professor (and first dean of the University of Chicago Law School) 
Joseph Henry Beale was the Reporter. Although dominant in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it is now retained 
by only around ten states.5 Its conceptual foundation is a principle 
4 See infra note 125 for one small exception. 
5 See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2014: Twenty· 
Eighth Annual Survey, 63 AM. J. COMP. L. 299, 351 (2015) (noting that Alabama, Georgia, 
Kansas, Maryland, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, 
and Wyoming still use the First Restatement for tort cases). 
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of exclusive legislative jurisdiction: a sovereign necessarily has 
sole lawmaking power over events within its borders.6 
Assume two married Californians are in a car accident in 
Georgia due to the wife's negligence. The husband sues the wife 
for compensation. Georgia law bars interspousal negligence suits.7 
California law allows them.8 Which law should the court use? 
To the vested rights theorist, only Georgia law applies, because 
only Georgia lawmakers can legally regulate accidents that occur 
within the borders of the state.9 When the accident occurred in 
Georgia, it became a fact that a Georgia legal right (protecting the 
wife from liability) was created.l0 That fact-that a Georgia legal 
6 See 1 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 46 (1935) ("[T]he law 
must extend over the entire territory subject to it and apply to every act done there, but only 
one law can so apply."); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFUCT OF LAWS 19 (1834) 
("(E) very nation possesses an exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within its own territory."). 
7 See O.C.G.A. § 19-3-8 (2016) (stating that spouses enjoy interspousal tort immunity); 
Bassett v. Harrington, 543 S.E.2d 798 (Ga. 2000) ("Under the common law doctrine of 
interspousal tort immunity (codified at OCGA § 19-3-8), actions between spouses for 
personal torts committed by one spouse against the other are barred .... "). 
8 See Klein v. Klein, 376 P.2d 70, 72 (Cal. 1962) (holding that interspousal immunity no 
longer exists for either intentional torts or torts based on negligence). 
9 This theory of exclusive legislative jurisdiction was complemented by a theory of 
exclusive adjudicative jurisdiction, famously expressed by Justice Field in Pennoyer v. Neff, 
95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877) ("[E)very state possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over 
persons and property within its territory."). The courts of only one sovereign have the 
power to issue a judgment binding upon the person of the defendant (that is, a judgment in 
personam), namely, the sovereign within whose borders the defendant happens to be at the 
initiation of the suit. By the same token, the courts of only one sovereign have the power to 
issue a judgment binding upon the property of the defendant (that is, a judgment in rem or 
quasi in rem), namely, the jurisdiction within whose borders the property happens to be at 
the initiation of the suit. A judgment of a court with adjudicative jurisdiction also creates a 
vested right, which other court systems ought to respect. 
10 What happens, one might ask, when the accident itself crosses borders, for example, 
when the negligent act occurs in Alabama and the resulting harm in Mississippi? E.g., 
Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Carroll, 11 So. 803, 804 (Ala. 1892) (negligent act 
committed by one employee in Alabama caused train to uncouple in Mississippi, causing harm 
to another employee). To Beale, the fact that the last event necessary to create the legal right 
at issue occurred within Mississippi's borders made it self-evident that Mississippi, and it 
alone, has lawmaking power. &e RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377-378 
(1934) (stating that "[t]he place of wrong is in the state where the last event necessary to make 
an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place," and "[t]he law of the place of the wrong 
determines whether a person has sustained a legal injury"). It is for the same reason that he 
claimed that the law of the place of acceptance, which is the last event necessary to create a 
contractual obligation, governed the validity and interpretation of a contract, no matter where 
the offer was made, the contracting parties reside, or performance was to occur. See 
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right had vested--ought to be respected by every sovereign's 
courts.l1 
For the vested rights theorist, a sovereign's lawmaking power is 
not merely exclusive, it is compulsory. A sovereign cannot fail to 
legally regulate everything within its sphere of lawmaking 
authority. As Beale put it: "It is unthinkable in a civilized country 
that any act should fall outside of the domain of law. If law be 
regarded as a command, then every act done must either be 
permitted or forbidden." 12 There can be no "hiatus or vacuum in 
the law."13 For example, if an action is subject to Georgia's 
exclusive legislative jurisdiction and one can find no Georgia law 
that forbids the action, then necessarily the action is permitted. 
There is no other alternative.l4 It follows that there are no gaps in 
conflicts cases. 
No one, to my knowledge, accepts this theory of exclusive 
legislative jurisdiction anymore. Sovereigns, we assume, have 
concurrent regulatory power over transactions that have 
connections with more than one jurisdiction.15 Both Georgia and 
California officials can legally regulate accidents in Georgia 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 311, 332 (1934) (stating that the law of the 
place of contracting governs questions of the validity of a contract). 
11 See 3 BEALE, supra note 6, at 1969 ("The law annexes to the event a certain 
consequence, namely, the creation of a legal right ... When a right has been created by 
law, this right itself becomes a fact . . . [T]he existing right should everywhere be 
recognized; since to do so is merely to recognize the existence of a fact."). Despite his theory 
of vested rights, Beale did not think that a foreign court is legally obligated to acknowledge 
these rights. Assume a California court has adjudicative jurisdiction over the California 
wife, because she was within the borders of California at the initiation of the suit. If the 
court were legally obligated to use Georgia law to adjudicate the husband's claim against 
her, the California court's exclusive power over persons and property within its borders 
would be compromised. Vested rights create legal reasons for territorial choice-of-law rules, 
but they do not legally obligate courts to adopt such rules. For a further discussion, see 
Michael S. Green, Legal Monism: An American History, in VIENNA LECTURES ON LAW AND 
PHILOSOPHY (Hart Publishing, forthcoming) (describing the vested rights approach); 
Roosevelt, supra note 3, at 2456 (same). 
12 1 BEALE, supra note 6, at 45. 
13 Id. 
14 This extends to all legal questions, such as duties of compensation. If looking to 
Georgia law does not show that someone suffering a harm in Georgia has a right to 
compensation, then necessarily he has no such right. 
15 See, e.g., Michael S. Green, Vertical Power, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 73, 81-85 (2014) 
(discussing the Supreme Court's recognition of concurrent regulatory authority between 
states and between states and the federal government). 
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involving Californians. 16 Indeed, concurrent regulatory power is 
now established constitutional law. The Supreme Court long ago 
abandoned its quixotic project of using the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause and the Due Pro~ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to divide states' lawmaking powers into exclusive spheres.l7 As 
the Court now sees it, a number of states may permissibly extend 
their law to an event, provided that there is "a significant contact 
or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such 
that choice of [the state's] law is neither arbitrary nor 
fundamentally unfair."18 Concurrent legislative jurisdiction has 
also been accepted as a matter of internationallaw.l9 
In addition, legal regulation is now seen as a discretionary 
matter, rather than something metaphysically compelled.2o If two 
sovereigns have the power to regulate, to insist that they both 
exercise that power would force them to engage in regulatory 
warfare. But it is surely possible that one sovereign might choose 
not to exercise its power because it thinks that the other has. The 
question is no longer whether a Californian's action in Georgia is 
legally forbidden or permitted under Georgia law. There is a third 
option. The action may be neither forbidden nor permitted. 
Georgia officials may have chosen to leave a legal void to be filled 
with California law. 
16 See id. at 82 (noting that "a state can extend its tort law to a transaction even if the 
harm occurred outside its borders"). 
17 See, e.g., N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 376--77 (1918) (reading into Due 
Process Clause the rule that the law of the state of contracting determines validity and 
scope of a contract). 
18 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981). Paired with this theory of 
concurrent legislative jurisdiction is a theory of concurrent adjudicative jurisdiction, as 
expressed in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). As the Supreme 
Court now sees it, more than one jurisdiction's courts are empowered under the Due Process 
Clause to assert jurisdiction in personam. Even though the defendant is currently outside its 
borders, a state court can still subject him to in personam jurisdiction, provided that there are 
minimum contacts with the state such that the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant does 
not offend "traditional notions affair play and substantial justice." Id. at 316. 
19 Under international law, a sovereign can have legislative jurisdiction over a 
transaction outside of its borders, for example, when the transaction involves its nationals. 
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (1987) ("[A) state has 
jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to ... the activities, interests, status, or relations 
of its nationals outside as well as within its territory."). 
zo See infra Section II.B.l. 
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If the conceptual foundation of vested rights theory has been 
rejected, why do some states still hang onto it? The main reason is 
its (apparent) predictability and ease of application.21 Under 
vested rights theory, choosing law turns out to be simple, at least 
in theory: just identify the sovereign that people in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries thought had exclusive 
lawmaking power over the event being adjudicated. In tort cases, 
this is the sovereign where the harm occurred.22 In contract cases, 
it is the sovereign where the contract was entered into.23 
But if lawmaking power is concurrent, vested rights theory-
whatever its predictability and ease of application-is irrational. 
If Georgia and California can both legally regulate an event in 
Georgia, Georgia may have chosen not to extend its law to the 
event out of deference to California's regulatory interests. To 
nevertheless apply Georgia law on the basis of an outdated theory 
of exclusive regulatory power frustrates California's regulatory 
interests without providing Georgia with any corresponding 
benefit. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that courts that use the vested 
rights approach rely on numerous "escape devices" that allow them 
to avoid the recommended choice, in favor of one more in keeping 
with governmental interests.24 But with these escape devices in 
place, the predictability and ease of application that were the main 
virtues of vested rights theory vanish. 
21 See, e.g., General Tel. Co. &c. v. Trimm, 311 S.E.2d 460, 460 (1984) ("Although [interest 
analysis] is a more recent development in choice of law cases, we are impressed with the 
findings of other jurisdictions that this approach is neither less confusing nor more certain 
than our traditional approach."); McMillan v. McMillan, 253 S.E.2d 662, 664 (Va. 1979) ("[W]e 
do not think that the uniformity, predictability, and ease of application of the Virginia rule 
should be abandoned."). 
22 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377-379 (1934) (stating that the 
law ofthe "place of wrong" determines liability under tort). 
23 I d. §§ 311, 332 (stating the law of the "place of contracting" determines the validity of a 
contract). 
24 See LEA BRILMAYER, AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISDICTION IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 226--29 (1986) (describing use of escape devices); KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, CONFLICT 
OF LAws 14-28 (2010) (same). 
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B. GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST ANALYSIS 
The remaining forty states, as well as the District of Columbia, 
have adopted some form of governmental interest analysis, which 
is based on the recognition that sovereigns can have concurrent 
regulatory power.25 To find out whether a jurisdiction's officials 
have chosen to extend their law to the facts of a conflicts case, 
interest analysts argue, a court should rely on the usual method 
for interpreting laws' scope.26 
1. False Conflicts. Consider a Georgia court adjudicating a case 
that presents no interjurisdictional problems. Two Georgians, who 
are married but legally separated, are in a car accident in Georgia 
due to the wife's negligence. The husband sues the wife for 
compensation under Georgia negligence law. The wife points to a 
Georgia statute codifying the common law rule of interspousal 
immunity.27 
The court seems to face a conflict of Georgia laws. Each party 
points to a Georgia law that appears to apply (negligence law and 
the interspousal immunity statute) and the court must choose 
25 As for federal courts, they usually do not use their own choice-of-law approach. When 
sitting in diversity or supplemental jurisdiction, they use the choice-of-law approach of the 
state where they are located_ See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 497 
(1941). But in certain federal question cases-for example, maritime cases whose facts 
might fall under federal law or the law of a foreign nation-they use what amounts to an 
interest analysis approach. See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 592 (1953) (looking, in 
part, to residence of parties to choose Danish law over American law); Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. 
Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 308 (1970) (looking, in part, to residence of parties to choose Greek 
law over American law); see generally Symeon Symeonides, Maritime Conflicts of Law from 
the Perspective of Modern Choice of Law Methodology, 7 MAR. LAW. 223 (1982). 
26 The idea that a court addressing a conflicts case should approach it the same way that 
a court adjudicating a case with purely domestic facts does is a pervasive theme among 
interest analysts. See BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 
183-84 (1963) (describing the process as "essentially the familiar one of constriction or 
interpretation" when adjudicating cases); Kermit Roosevelt III, Resolving Renvoi: The 
Bewitchment of Our Intelligence by Means of Language, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1821, 
1888-89 (2005) ("[T]he idea that conflicts should return from its self-imposed exile and 
rejoin the body of ordinary legal analysis is a staple of the literature."); Larry Kramer, 
Return of the Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 1005 (1991) (stating that the only difference 
between choice of law and other legal problems is that "some of the facts are connected to 
different states"). 
27 O.C.G.A. § 19-3-8; see Bassett v. Harrington, 543 S.E.2d 798, 799 (Ga. 2000) (stating 
that under Georgia law "actions between spouses for personal torts committed by one 
spouse against the other are barred"). 
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between them. One might think that the court should rely on legal 
principles that deal with such conflicts, for example, that laws 
enacted later defeat those enacted earlier (lex posterior derogat legi 
priori), that statutes trump common law, that more specific 
statutes take precedence over more general ones (lex specialis 
derogat legi generali), and so on. Using these principles, the 
interspousal immunity statute should obviously take priority. 
But before the court makes a choice of law, shouldn't it first 
determine whether both laws actually apply to the facts? Perhaps 
the interspousal immunity statute is inapplicable to separated 
spouses. In fact, the Supreme Court of Georgia asked this very 
question in Harris v. Harris.2s 
One could imagine the court resolving the question by looking 
to the plain text of the statute. The statute says that spouses are 
not permitted to sue one another for negligence, and separated 
spouses are still spouses.29 But the court assumed that the term 
"spouses" was not intended to answer the question. Since no 
textual resolution of the statute's scope was possible, it looked to 
the statute's purposes, in order to determine whether they would 
be vindicated through its application to the facts. 
Interspousal immunity, the court concluded, exists to encourage 
marital harmony and to keep spouses from engaging in insurance 
fraud by staging accidents.30 The statute should not be read as 
applying to separated spouses, therefore, because there is no 
significant marital harmony to disturb and no serious worry about 
collusion and fraud. 31 There was no conflict of laws after all. Only 
Georgia negligence law applied. 
The interest analyst argues that the same method should be 
used when the laws of different jurisdictions appear to conflict. 
The scope of the laws at issue should first be examined to see if the 
apparent conflict is real. Consider our case of two married 
2s 313 S.E.2d 88, 89 (Ga. 1984). 
29 O.C.G.A. § 19-3-8. Technically, the statute says only that "[i]nterspousal tort immunity, 
as it existed immediately prior to July 1, 1983, shall continue to exist on and after July 1, 
1983." But the common law rule referred to speaks of "spouses." E.g., Robeson v. Int'l Indem. 
Co., 282 S.E.2d 896, 897 (Ga. 1981) (stating that common law rule concerns "personal torts 
committed by one spouse against the other"). 
30 Id. at 898. 
31 Harris, 313 S.E.2d at 89-90. 
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Californians who are in a car accident in Georgia.32 Should 
Georgia's interspousal immunity statute be used, or California 
law, which allows for interspousal negligence liability? Before 
relying on some principle for resolving a conflict between two 
jurisdictions' laws, the court should first determine whether there 
is a conflict at all. 
Textualism cannot answer this question, because laws rarely 
limit their territorial scope explicitly.33 If one were to follow their 
plain meaning, they would apply to everyone, everywhere in the 
world.34 Georgia's interspousal immunity statute speaks of spouses, 
not Georgia spouses or spouses who get into accidents in Georgia.35 
Under a purely textualist reading, the statute applies to Mongolian 
spouses who get into accidents in Finland. Courts must therefore 
look to laws' purposes to determine their territorial scope. 
The purposes of Georgia's interspousal immunity statute, as we 
have seen, are encouraging marital harmony and avoiding 
insurance fraud. 36 But these purposes are irrelevant, the interest 
analyst would argue, concerning a California married couple that 
gets into an accident in Georgia. Georgia lawmakers aren't 
interested in the marital harmony of California couples or fraud 
concerning California insurance contracts. Those are California's 
concern. 
So Georgia law does not apply. By contrast, California law 
does. The purposes of California law are those of negligence law 
generally-deterrence and compensation. California lawmakers 
believe in deterring interspousal negligence and compensating 
those harmed by such negligence. 37 True, they are probably not 
interested in deterring interspousal negligence in Georgia, even 
32 The Californians are not separated, making the exception in Harris v. Harris 
inapplicable. 
33 For a rare counterexample, see WIS. STAT. § 895.03 (2015) (action for wrongful death 
"caused in this state"). 
34 Kramer, supra note 2, at 1052-53. 
35 In fact, the statute refers to the common law rule. O.C.G.A. § 19-3-8. But the language 
of the common law rule refers to spouses generally, without any territorial limitation. 
Robeson, 282 S.E.2d at 897. 
36 Id. at 898. 
37 See Klein, 376 P.2d at 72-73 (stressing that it is "fundamental in the law of torts that 
any person proximately injured by the act of another, whether that act be willful or 
negligent, should ... be compensated''). 
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when it is a· Californian who is negligent. That's Georgia's 
business. But California's compensatory interest in the case is 
real. California lawmakers want all Californians harmed due to 
the negligence of a spouse to be made whole, no matter where the 
accident occurred. 
As the interest analyst would describe it, our case is a false 
conflict, in which no choice of law is necessary.38 Only California 
law applies. The recommendation of vested rights theory, which is 
to use the law of the place of the accident (here, Georgia's 
interspousal immunity statute), frustrates the purposes of the only 
interested jurisdiction. 39 
2. Loss-Allocating and Conduct-Regulating Rules. The way the 
interest analyst reads laws' territorial scope (particularly in tort 
cases) depends upon a distinction between conduct-regulating and 
loss-allocating rules. A rule is conduct-regulating if it imposes a 
duty of compensation as a means of discouraging people from 
engaging in the conduct that gave rise to the plaintiffs harm. 
And, if the rule limits or rejects a duty of compensation, it is 
conduct-regulating if it seeks to give people the freedom to engage 
in the conduct.4° For example, negligence liability is conduct-
regulating to the extent that it imposes liability in order to 
discourage negligent conduct. And barring liability when someone 
causes harm through non-negligent conduct is conduct-regulating 
to the extent that it is intended to give people the freedom to 
engage in such conduct. 
If all laws were solely conduct-regulating, there would be few 
cases in which interest analysis and vested rights theory come out 
differently, for interest analysts understand the scope of conduct-
regulating rules territorially. The jurisdiction that created the 
38 The cases in which states have abandoned vested rights theory for interest analysis have 
almost always been false conflicts. E.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 281, 285 (N.Y. 
1963); Jagers v. Royal Indem. Co., 276 So. 2d 309, 311 (Li. 1973); SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, 
THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION: PAST, PRESENT AND FuTuRE 145 (2006). 
39 E.g., Forsman v. Forsman, 779 P.2d 218, 219-20 (Utah 1989) (using interest analysis 
to apply California negligence law rather than Utah's rule of interspousal immunity to suit 
by California wife against her husband concerning an accident in Utah). 
•o Joseph William Singer, Real Conflicts, 69 B.U. L. REV. 1, 39-40 (1989) (discussing 
"liberty interests" in tort law that "grant people freedom to act without regard to the 
consequences to others"). 
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conduct-regulating rule is interested in its applying to all 
instances of the conduct in the jurisdiction and all instances of the 
conduct outside the jurisdiction that cause harm m the 
jurisdiction. 41 The residence of the parties is irrelevant. 
A rule is loss-allocating, by contrast, if it imposes or bars a duty 
of compensation for different reasons than discouraging or 
encouraging the conduct that gave rise to the plaintiffs harm.42 
With respect to some loss-allocating rules, the purpose is 
vindicating a view about the appropriate ex post distribution of the 
loss between the plaintiff and the defendant. An example is 
respondeat superior, that is, the rule holding an employer 
vicariously liable for the torts of its employees, even though the 
employer behaved non-negligently in hiring and supervision. The 
rule is not conduct-regulating, because holding the employer liable 
is not intended to change the employer's hiring and supervision: by 
assumption the employer acted with due care. The rule is instead 
the expression of a judgment that the loss ought to be put on the 
employer, particularly when employees are commonly without 
sufficient assets to provide compensation to the plaintiff 
themselves. 
Some rules perform both conduct-regulating and loss-allocating 
functions. Negligence liability is an example. Its goals are 
deterring negligent conduct and making those who suffer harm 
41 The only way that interest analysis and vested rights theory would come out 
differently concerning conduct-regulating rules is when the harm and the conduct at issue 
occurred in different jurisdictions. See supra note 10. 
42 See Joseph William Singer, Facing Real Conflicts, 24 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 197, 207 (1991) 
(" 'Loss-allocating' rules are intended to place the losses occasioned by social activity on the 
appropriate party even if those rules will leave unaffected the intensity, frequency, or manner 
of the harmful activity."). For more on the distinction, see generally SYMEONIDES, supra note 
38, at 123-40; Robert A. Sedler, Professor Juenger's Challenge to the Interest Analysis 
Approach to Choice of Law: An Appreciation and a Response, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 865, 883-
84 (1990). In New York, the distinction is explicitly relied on in its choice-of-law rules for 
torts. See Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454, 455-58 (N.Y. 1972) (using the distinction). 
The distinction is also used in Oregon and Louisiana's choice-of-law statutes. OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 15.440 (2016); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 3542-48 (2016). For criticism of the distinction, see 
Wendy Collins Perdue, A Reexamination of the Distinction between "Loss-Allocating" and 
"Conduct-Regulating Rules," 60 LA. L. REV. 1251, 1253 (2000) (using the examples of strict 
liability and limits on damages); Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative 
Intent, 78 MICH. L. REV. 392, 405 (1980) ("[M]any of the statutes that interest analysts call 
protective or compensatory alter incentives in a way that suggests that the legislature was 
aware of, and probably approved of, their regulatory effects."). 
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from such conduct whole. But some rules, such as respondeat 
superior, are commonly understood as solely loss-allocating. 
Although I will use the term "loss-allocating" myself, I should 
note that it is misleading, for some "loss-allocating" rules have as 
their purpose the encouragement or discouragement of conduct. 
The relevant conduct, however, is something other than the 
conduct that created the plaintiffs harm. Interspousal immunity 
is an example. The rule is not described as conduct-regulating, 
because it does not have as its purpose making spouses feel free to 
behave negligently toward one another. But at least one of its 
purposes is discouraging a certain form of conduct, namely staging 
accidents in order to defraud insurance companies.43 
It is concerning loss-allocating rules that interest analysis and 
vested rights theory come out very differently. The vested rights 
theorist treats loss-allocating and conduct-regulating tort rules the 
same-the law of the place of the harm applies. For the interest 
analyst, by contrast, the scope of a loss-allocating rule is generally 
tied to the residence of one or both of the parties. .Georgia's 
interspousal immunity statute, for example, applies only to 
Georgia couples, including Georgia couples who get into accidents 
in other states. It does not apply to Californians who get into 
accidents in Georgia. 
3. True Conflicts. To repeat, in the false conflict context, no 
choice of law is necessary, because only one jurisdiction's law 
applies. Only if the case is a true conflict, in which at least one 
purpose of each jurisdiction's law would be furthered by the law's 
application to the facts, is a genuine choice of law required. An 
example of a true conflict is a Georgia married couple's accident in 
California. California is interested in its negligence law (in its 
conduct-regulating function) being used, as a means of deterring 
interspousal negligence in the state, and Georgia is interested in 
43 An example of a ''loss-allocating" rule that has as one of its purposes encouraging activity 
is charitable immunity, in which a charity is not liable for harm resulting from its negligent 
hiring or supervision of workers. The rule is not conduct-regulating, for negligent hiring and 
supervision are admittedly wrongful. The rule is not meant to make charities feel free to 
negligently hire and supervise. See generally SYMEON SYMEONIDES, AMERICAN PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 135 (2008); see also Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 480 N.E.2d 
679, 684-88 (N.Y. 1985). But the rule arguably does seek to encourage a certain type of 
conduct, namely charitable activity, by lowering its cost. SYMEONIDES, supra, at 200. 
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its interspousal immunity statute being used, as a means of 
encouraging the marital harmony of Georgia couples and 
preventing fraud concerning Georgia insurance contracts. 
Although all interest analysis approaches generally come to the 
same conclusion about false conflicts,44 they disagree about how 
true conflicts should be resolved.45 Brainerd Currie, the father of 
interest analysis, argued that a court is institutionally obligated to 
favor the interests of its own jurisdiction, even if these interests 
are weaker. 46 Kentucky and Michigan are two states that 
44 I include the Second Restatement here. Under the Second Restatement, a court 
chooses "the local law of the state which, with respect to the particular issue, has the most 
significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONFLICT OF LAws§ 145 (1971). In determining which jurisdiction has the most significant 
relationship, a court looks, at least in part (and often solely), to the interests of the forum 
and the other relevant jurisdictions. Thus, the Second Restatement also recommends that 
interspousal immunity be governed by the law of the place of the marital domicile, id. § 169, 
and many courts in Second Restatement jurisdictions would describe our example of a 
California married couple's accident in Georgia as a "false conflict." See William A. Reppy, 
Jr., Codifying Interest Analysis in the Torts Chapter of a New Conflicts Restatement, 75 IND. 
L.J. 591, 591-93 (2000) (describing how numerous jurisdictions engraft the concept of a 
false conflict onto the Second Restatement). 
45 Part of the problem is that a proper resolution would appear to require a court to 
compare the strengths of the jurisdictions' competing purposes. And interjurisdictional utility 
comparisons, like interpersonal utility comparisons, are impossible. See generally Daniel M. 
Hausman, The Impossibility of Interpersonal Utility Comparisons, 104 MIND 473, 473-90 
(1995). For a discussion of this problem, see ROOSEVELT, supra note 24, at 66--67. Hence the 
attraction of the false conflict, in which no weighing of one jurisdiction's interest against 
another's is necessary, because there is only one jurisdiction with an interest in its law 
applying. The false conflict is the jurisprudential version of a Pareto superior change in 
distribution; that is, a change in which at least one party is made better off and no one is made 
worse off. Welfare maximizers like the Pareto superior change because they can know that it 
increases aggregate utility without having to engage in interpersonal utility comparisons. See 
generally Gary Lawson, Efficiency and Individualism, 42 DUKE L.J. 53, 85 (1992). 
46 CURRIE, supra note 26, at 119 (describing this obligation as the "sensible and clearly 
constitutional thing for any court to do"); ROOSEVELT, supra note 24, at 44-45 (Currie 
"[a]ssume[s] a quite selfish state, concerned only with promoting its own interests; a state, 
if you please, blind to consequences, and interested only in short-run 'gains'"). It is true 
that the result will be that the law used will depend upon where the action is brought, but 
Currie thought that the resolution of that problem should be left to Congress, using its 
power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, to resolve. Brainerd Currie, Comments on 
Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 
1243 (1963). The only exception to this preference for forum law is when the existence of a 
true conflict gives the forum's sovereign a reason to relinquish its interest. Currie described 
this as the "moderate and restrained interpretation" of forum interest. Brainerd Currie, 
The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 754, 757 (1963). But he 
appeared to limit it to cases where the forum yields out of concern for the reasonable 
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arguably have adopted this strong preference for forum law in true 
conflicts.47 But most states allow forum interests to yield, at 
times, to the interests of another jurisdiction.48 
C. UNPROVIDED-FOR CASES 
Although true conflicts are problematic, they are not 
theoretically puzzling. It is expected that jurisdictions' regulatory 
interests will sometimes conflict and that some method of 
resolving these conflicts is needed. But what happens if an 
examination of laws' purposes leads the court to conclude that 
neither jurisdiction's law applies? Interest analysts call these 
unprovided-for cases. 
expectations of the parties. This is suggested by his use of Bernkrant v. Fowler, 360 P.2d 
906 (Cal. 1961), as an example of the moderate and restrained interpretation in action. 
Currie, supra, at 757-58. 
47 Symeonides, supra note 5, at 351. 
48 For example, some states use Leflar's "choice-influencing considerations" approach. 
Under this approach, a court may prefer one jurisdiction's law over another in a true 
conflict-including foreign over forum law--on the ground that the chosen law is "better." 
The five states that use Leflar's approach for tort cases are Arkansas, Minnesota, New 
Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. Id. See, e.g., Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 550 
S.W.2d 453, 456-59 (Ark. 1977); Milkovich v. Saari, 203 N.W.2d 408, 413 (Minn. 1973); 
Clark v. Clark, 222 A.2d 205, 210 (N.H. 1966); Woodward v. Stewart, 243 A.2d 917, 923 
(R.I. 1968); Heath v. Zellmer, 151 N.W.2d 664, 672 (Wis. 1967). Deciding on the basis of the 
better law is only one consideration out of five that might be used to resolve true conflicts 
under Leflar's approach. Other considerations include predictability of results, 
maintenance of interstate and international order, simplification of the judicial task, and 
advancement of the forum's governmental interests. Robert A Leflar, Conflicts Law: More 
on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1584, 1586-88 (1966). 
Other interest analysis approaches avoid normatively assessing the laws at issue. 
California, for example, uses William Baxter's comparative impairment approach, in which 
a court facing a true conflict chooses the law whose underlying purposes would be most 
impaired if it were not used. William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 
STAN. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1963); see generally Herma Hill Kay, The Use of Comparative 
Impairment to Resolve True Conflicts: An Evaluation of the California Experience, 68 CAL. 
L. REV. 577 (1980). For an argument that California has recently retreated from the 
comparative impairment approach, see Michael H. Hoffheimer, California's Territorial Thrn 
in Choice of Law, 67 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 167 (2015). 
Of the remaining states that have moved away from vested rights theory, the vast 
majority have adopted the Second Restatement. Just how true conflicts are to be resolved 
under the Second Restatement is hard to discern, because the identification of false conflicts 
and the various means for resolving true ones are all lumped together haphazardly in a 
master rule used to determine which state has the "most significant relationship." 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS§ 6 (1971). 
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1. Neumeier v. Kuehner. For an example of an unprovided-for 
case, consider Neumeier v. Kuehner (with its facts somewhat 
simplified in a manner that doesn't affect the analysis). 49 A New 
Yorker driving with an Ontario guest gets into an accident in 
Ontario. The Ontario guest sues the New York host for negligence 
in New York state court.50 Ontario has a guest statute, which bars 
guests in cars from suing their hosts for negligence. Under New 
York law, hosts can be liable to guests for negligence. Which law 
should the court use? 
As we've seen, under interest analysis a court should first 
determine the purposes of each law involved and then decide 
whether these purposes would be vindicated by the law's 
application to the facts of the conflicts case. The New York Court 
of Appeals had earlier concluded that the purpose of Ontario's 
guest statute is discouraging the guest and host from staging an 
accident so that they can collect from the host's insurance 
company.51 The guest statute is therefore a loss-allocating rule, 
which applies only when the host is from Ontario. If the host is 
from another jurisdiction, the consequences of the possible fraud 
(say, rising insurance rates) would be felt there. Ontario is 
therefore not interested in its law applying in Neumeier, since the 
host is from New York.52 Avoiding fraud concerning New York 
insurance contracts is New York's business. 
What about New York negligence law then? The purposes 
standing behind that law are deterring negligence by hosts and 
compensating guests they harm.53 The deterrence purpose is 
conduct-regulating and so implicated only when the accident is in 
New York. New York lawmakers are not interested in deterring 
negligence by hosts, even New York hosts, wherever it might occur. 
Deterring negligence by hosts in Ontario is Ontario's business. 
That leaves New York negligence law in its loss-allocating 
function. Here too New York is not interested. New York 
49 286 N.E.2d 454 (1972). 
50 In the actual Neumeier case, the Ontario host and guest died in the accident. The action 
was brought by the Ontarian's administratrix against the New Yorker's estate. Id. at 455. 
51 Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284--85 (N.Y. 1963). 
52 Currie, in his discussion of Babcock, agreed. CURRIE, supra note 26, at 724-25. 
53 See Babcock, 191 N.E.2d at 284 ("New York's policy of requiring a tort-feasor to 
compensate his guest for injuries caused by his negligence cannot be doubted."). 
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lawmakers do not want to ensure that any guest harmed by a 
negligent host is compensated. They are interested only in 
ensuring the New York guests are compensated.54 Compensating 
Ontario guests is Ontario's business. 
In Neumeier, each jurisdiction lacks an interest in extending its 
law to the facts of the case, creating what appears to be a gap in 
the law. The apparent solution would be for the court to create a 
legal rule to fill the gap, by considering relevant Ontario and New 
York regulatory policies. But that is not the approach that Currie, 
who first identified the unprovided-for case, recommended. Currie 
thought it was beyond the judicial competence to exercise 
lawmaking power in conflicts cases, even though he ·must have 
been aware that courts create legal rules to fill in gaps in other 
areas oflaw.55 
As Currie saw it, the only governmental interests that can exist 
are those generated when the purposes of preexisting laws are 
vindicated through their application.56 If the purposes of no 
preexisting law would be vindicated, there are simply no 
governmental interests to take into account. No jurisdiction "cares 
what happens."57 Freestanding governmental policies that might 
recommend creating a new legal rule don't count. 
Instead of allowing a court to make a new legal rule, Currie 
tried to solve the puzzle of the unprovided-for case by arguing that 
every court entertaining a case begins with a presumption in favor 
of the application of its own law.58 Only if there is a reason to 
depart from the law of the forum should a court apply the law of 
another jurisdiction. In an unprovided-for case no reason can be 
found, so forum law applies. The presumption of forum law 
ensures that there are no gaps in conflicts cases. Forum law fills 
in anything that might be left unregulated. 
54 See John Hart Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in Protecting its Own, 23 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 173, 201-05 (1981); Robert Allen Sedler, Interstate Accidents and the 
Unprovided for Case: Reflections on Neumeier v. Kuehner, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 125, 125--26 
(1973). 
55 CURRIE, supra note 26, at 153-54. 
56 Kramer, supra note 2, at 1050 ("Currie believed that only interests expressed in a 
state's lawfully enacted rules are relevant to choice of law."). 
57 CURRIE, supra note 26, at 152. 
58 Id. at 183-84. 
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But that· means that Currie's approach is as arbitrary as the 
vested rights theory he criticized. 59 The fundamental problem 
with the vested rights approach was its assumption that a 
jurisdiction's law applies within its borders whether or not the 
law's purposes would be vindicated. But Currie makes the same 
mistake, except that now it is forum law that IS applied 
mindlessly, without regard to purposes. 
2. The Pro-Resident Bias. Given the inadequacy of Currie's 
response, the unprovided-for case has been a focus of critics of 
interest analysis. A common observation is that it arises because 
interest analysts read loss-allocating rules as applying only if a 
resident will benefit. This pro-resident bias improperly narrows 
laws' scope, with the result that some cases fall under no 
jurisdiction's law. 
The critics argue that interest analysts adopt the pro-resident 
bias tendentiously, in an attempt to generate the hoped-for false 
conflict.60 Once the scope of loss-allocating rules is understood 
59 See Kermit Roosevelt III, Brainerd Currie's Contribution to Choice of Law: Looking 
Back, Looking Forward, 65 MERCER L. REV. 501, 512 (2014) (arguing that the presumption 
"makes no sense if you think about [choice of law] (as Currie thought we should) as an issue 
about the scope of state laws"). In addition, we have no answer to how a court of a third 
jurisdiction with adjudicative power but without any regulatory interest should deal with 
the case. In this circumstance, Currie could not decide between using forum law and the 
"bolder technique" of a court placing itself "in the position of Congress, and [reaching] the 
decision [it thinks] Congress would reach if it were to consider the matter." A court 
following the latter approach would act as a "guardian of the national interest," and 
attempt to identify the "more enlightened and humane" rule. Currie, The Disinterested 
Third State, supra note 46, at 778-80. 
60 Often this criticism of the bias is constitutional in nature: The emphasis on benefiting 
residents violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article N. Ely, supra note 54, at 
191 (concluding that "an interest analyst approach to choice-of-law problems ... is 
unconstitutional"); Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The 
Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 336 (1992) ("Choice-of-
law methods that prefer local litigants, local law, or better law are unconstitutional."). 
According to these arguments, states are constitutionally obligated to extend the benefits of 
their laws without discrimination on the basis of residence. This means adopting a 
territorial approach similar to the First Restatement. Notice that such critics would agree 
with Currie and Beale that the unprovided-for case does not create a gap in the law. The 
force of the Constitution means that the law of the place of the accident applies. 
Larry Kramer, following Currie, has criticized this argument, I believe effectively, by 
noting that when a jurisdiction refuses to extend a loss-allocating rule to benefit a non-
resident, it can do so as a means of permitting the law of the non-resident's jurisdiction to 
be used. For example, when a court refuses to extend Georgia's interspousal immunity 
statute to a California married couple that gets into an accident in Georgia, it does so as a 
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more broadly, such that they can burden as well as benefit 
residents, the result is not merely that the unprovided-for case 
disappears. True conflicts proliferate. 
For an example of how the pro-resident bias puts a thumb on 
the scales in favor of false conflicts, consider Hurtado v. Superior 
Court. 61 A family from the Mexican state of Zacatecas sued a 
Californian in California state court for wrongful death concerning 
a California accident in which a Zacatecan was killed.62 Zacatecan 
law had a limitation on the amount of damages for wrongful death; 
California law allowed unlimited damages.63 
The California Supreme Court concluded that the case was a 
false conflict. 64 The Zacatecan limitation was a loss-allocating rule 
intended by Zacatecan lawmakers to protect against "exaggerated 
claims."65 It followed from the pro-resident bias that the limitation 
applied only to Zacatecan defendants, because only then would it 
benefit Zacatecans. The limitation therefore did not apply in 
Hurtado, because the defendant was from California.66 On the 
other hand, California law did apply. Of course, California's 
unlimited damages rule did not apply in its loss-allocating 
function. As a means of ensuring adequate compensation to 
plaintiffs, it applied only when the plaintiff was a Californian. In 
Hurtado the plaintiff was from Zacatecas. But the court concluded 
that the rule was also conduct-regulating.67 It was intended, in 
means of allowing California law to apply. It is true that the California defendant is denied 
a benefit that would be given to a Georgia defendant. But this is to allow California to 
vindicate its regulatory purposes concerning California couples. That is miles away from 
the usual form of invidious discrimination against non-residents that the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause was intended to prohibit. Reading the Clause as requiring Georgia to 
extend its interspousal immunity law to the California defendant (and thus to frustrate 
California regulatory purposes) would be perverse, for it would create the very sort of 
interstate friction that the Clause was meant to prevent. Kramer, supra note 2, at 1065-72. 
This helps explain why courts have not discussed, much less accepted, the critics' argument. 
See, e.g., Skahill v. Capital Airlines, 234 F. Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). For further 
discussion of Kramer's position, see infra note 78. 
61 522 P.2d 666 (Cal. 1974). 
62 Id. at 668. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 674. 
65 Id. at 670. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 672. 
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part, to maximize the deterrence of tortious conduct.68 California 
was therefore interested in the law applying, because the tortious 
conduct at issue occurred in California. 
Once interest analysis loses its pro-resident bias, Hurtado 
becomes a true conflict. If Zacatecan lawmakers enacted their 
limitation not just to protect Zacatecan defendants from being 
subject to exaggerated claims, but also to prevent Zacatecan 
plaintiffs from making such claims, the limitation would apply.69 
Furthermore, if California's unlimited damages rule in its loss-
allocating function ensures that California defendants adequately 
compensate those harmed by their negligence, in addition to 
ensuring that California plaintiffs are adequately compensated, it 
too would apply.7o 
The unprovided-for case is useful for criticizing the pro-resident 
bias, because in the unprovided-for case the loss-allocating rule of 
the plaintiffs residence benefits the defendant, by barring or 
limiting liability, and the loss-allocating rule of the defendant's 
residence benefits the plaintiff, by being pro-recovery. The bias 
forces a court to conclude that neither rule applies. In addition, in 
an unprovided-for case no jurisdiction has a conduct-regulating 
interest. To avoid the conclusion that no jurisdiction's law applies, 
the critics argue, one must read loss-allocating rules as both 
benefiting and burdening residents, 71 with a resulting increase in 
the number of true conflicts.72 
68 Id. 
69 Cf. Erny v. Estate of Merola, 792 A.2d 1208, 1211 (N.J. 2002) (attributing to New York 
a loss-allocating policy of requiring negligent New Yorkers to compensate those they harm, 
even when the accident occurs outside the state and the plaintiff is not a New Yorker); 
Kaiser-Georgetown Cmty. Health Plan, Inc. v. Stutsman, 491 A.2d 502, 509-10 (D.C. 1985) 
(finding that D.C. has an interest in holding D.C. corporations responsible for compensating 
those harmed by their negligence, even when wrongdoing was in Virginia and plaintiff was 
a Virginian). 
7° Conduct-regulating rules can also be read more broadly. New York negligence law 
might be understood as intended to deter not merely negligent conduct within the state, but 
also negligent conduct by New Yorkers in other states. Erny, 792 A.2d at 1220 (New York is 
interested in its negligence law being used for New Yorkers driving in other states as a 
means of encouraging them to drive safely there). 
n Indeed, some argue, why limit the scope of a loss-allocating rule on the basis of 
residence at all? Why not extend it to loss-causing conduct in the jurisdiction, whatever the 
residence of the parties? See Joseph William Singer, Justice and the Conflict of Laws, 48 
MERCER L. REV. 831, 832 (1997) (stating that the "place of the injury has the legitimate 
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But is the pro-resident bias really as important to interest 
analysis as these critics make it out to be? With respect to many 
loss-allocating rules, the issue is not whether the rule will benefit a 
resident, but some other consideration that suggests that the rule 
applies only to residents. For example, the reason that Ontario's 
guest statute applied only to Ontario hosts and not to Ontario 
guests in Neumeier was not because that is when Ontarians would 
benefit from the statute. The purpose of the statute was to 
prevent the guest and host from bringing a collusive suit in order 
to defraud the host's insurance company.73 The statute applied 
only to Ontario hosts because that is when the consequences of a 
collusive suit-such as increased insurance rates-would most 
likely be felt in the province. Indeed, the statute arguably 
disadvantaged the Ontario hosts to whom it applied. If the suits 
really were collusive, the guests would presumably have shared 
the proceeds with the hosts had the suits been allowed to continue. 
In addition, even when the scope of a loss-allocating rule is 
genuinely limited only to cases in which it benefits residents, it is 
not clear that this is the result of impermissible bias. Such a 
limitation on scope can be understood as a form of deference to the 
power and obligation to ensure that there is a remedy for the infringement of the plaintiff's 
right to bodily security" regardless of residence); Donald T. Trautman, Two Views on Kell v. 
Henderson· A Comment, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 465, 467 (1967) (place of injury can have a 
compensatory interest concerning non-residents); Singer, supra note 40, at 37-39, 97 (place 
of injury has moral interest in compensation to non-residents); Aaron D. Twerski, 
Enlightened Territorialism and Professor Caver:;: The Pennsylvania Method, 9 DUQ. L. REV. 
373, 382-85 (1971) (because tort laws embody "moral judgments" a court should not assume 
that legislators intended to confine their benefits to residents). 
72 The conclusions drawn from the proliferation of true conflicts are varied. Joseph 
William Singer has recommended, for example, that courts embrace a normative approach, 
in which choice of the better law plays a more substantial role. Joseph William Singer, 
Multistate Justice: Better Law, Comity, and Fairness in the Conflict of Laws, 2015 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1923; Singer, supra note 40, at 6. Others recommend that courts give up answering 
conflicts cases on the basis of governmental interests entirely and return to a more 
territorial approach like the First Restatement. Twerski, supra note 71, at 373, 382. This 
recommendation arguably has been followed by the minority of jurisdictions that have 
retained vested rights theory, for they have done so, in part, because they find that if 
governmental interest are read broadly, irreconcilable true conflicts abound. See, e.g., 
McMillan v. McMillan, 253 S.E.2d 662, 664--65 (Va. 1979) (criticizing "uncertainty and 
confusion" of interest analysis approaches). 
73 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
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regulatory interests of other jurisdictions.74 For example, the 
reason Zacatecan lawmakers do not protect Californian defendants 
sued by Zacatecan plaintiffs from excessive demands for 
compensation might be because they think that the appropriate 
protection of such California defendants should be left to 
California lawmakers. So understood, reading the scope of loss-
allocating rules to benefit residents is a comity-enabling 
presumption, not a bias.75 
Ill. KRAMER'S ''MYTH" OF THE UNPROVIDED-FOR CASE 
But even if the pro-resident bias is reinterpreted as a comity-
enabling presumption, the critics still seem right that it should be 
abandoned in the unprovided-for case. The facts in Neumeier 
appear to fall under neither Ontario nor New York law only 
because the pro-resident presumption leads us to conclude that 
each jurisdiction is deferring to what it assumes are the greater 
regulatory interests of the other. Since neither Ontario nor New 
York has such a greater regulatory interest, the presumption 
should be abandoned. New York should be understood as 
extending its negligence law to New York hosts, as a means of 
compelling them to make whole all the guests they harm. And 
Ontario should be understood as extending its guest statute to 
Ontario guests, to discourage them from participating in a possibly 
collusive lawsuit. The result would be that the case is an evenly-
balanced true conflict-both Ontario and New York law apply. 
Courts would come to similar conclusions in other unprovided-for 
cases. They would end up as true conflicts. 
But Larry Kramer offers a different solution to the unprovided-
for case. As he sees it, there is no reason to abandon the pro-
resident presumption. The reason is that one jurisdiction always 
has a neglected law that supports governmental interests to which 
the other jurisdiction should defer. The unprovided-for case is 
really a false conflict. 
74 See supra note 60. 
75 Larry Kramer largely retains the pro-resident presumption on these grounds. Kramer, 
supra note 2, at 1067. But see part IV.B, infra, for a discussion of an area where Kramer 
inconsistently departs from the presumption. 
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A. AFFIRMATIVE-DEFENSE CASES 
As the critics see it, Ontario's only interest in Neumeier is the 
relatjve weak one that results from a broader reading of its guest 
statute's scope. Its only interest is in ensuring that Ontario guests 
do not participate in a possibly collusive suit, even though such a 
suit will have most of its negative effects in New York. But is that 
really Ontario's sole interest? Neumeier involved a negligent host 
in Ontario causing an accident in which an Ontario guest was 
harmed. Wouldn't Ontario lawmakers want compensation to the 
Ontario guest and deterrence of negligence by hosts in Ontario? It 
is true that Ontario legislators concluded that compensation and 
deterrence are not as important as worries about insurance fraud. 
That's why they enacted the guest statute. But they were thinking 
about cases where the host is from Ontario, such that the 
consequences of the fraud would be felt there. When the host is a 
New Yorker, wouldn't the importance of compensation and 
deterrence rise to the fore? 
One might argue that the problem with such a solution is that 
Ontario has no law supporting these interests in compensation 
and deterrence in guest-host cases. And the only relevant 
governmental interests that interest analysts recognize are those 
that stand behind preexisting laws. There appears to be no 
Ontario law allowing guests to sue hosts for negligence because, as 
interest analysts like Currie see it, the Ontario guest statute 
removed all possibilities of a guest suing a host for negligence 
under Ontario law. But Kramer argues that this is a mistake. 
The extent to which the guest statute displaced Ontario negligence 
law in guest-host suits, he argues, must be read in the light of the 
guest statute's purpose. Since it follows from its purpose that it 
extends only to cases in which the host is from Ontario, the statute 
displaces Ontario negligence law only in such cases.76 Ontario 
negligence law still applies to guest-host suits in which the host is 
not from Ontario.77 It follows, therefore, that a court facing the 
76 Kramer, supra note 2, at 1059-60. 
77 Or rather, Ontario negligence law applies to such suits provided that the compensatory 
or deterrent purposes of Ontario negligence law would be advanced, namely when the guest 
is an Ontarian or the accident happened in Ontario. Both of these are the case in Neumeier. 
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facts in Neumeier should allow the Ontario guest to recover under 
this preexisting Ontario negligence law.78 Kramer is able to turn 
Neumeier into a false conflict while satisfying the demand that 
only preexisting laws can be used in conflicts cases. 
There is an undeniable logic to Kramer's argument. If, as 
Currie would insist, the scope of the guest statute should be read 
in the light of its purpose, why shouldn't the manner in which the 
guest statute displaces Ontario negligence law be read in the light 
of the guest statute's purpose? 
Kramer employs the same solution to a hypothetical 
unprovided-for case, originally discussed by Currie. (This 
hypothetical is a variation on an actual case, Grant u. McAuliffe. 79) 
In the hypothetical, a Californian negligently causes an accident in 
Arizona in which an Arizonan is injured.80 The Californian 
subsequently dies of his injuries. The Arizonan then sues the 
Californian's estate for negligence. Arizona has retained the 
common law rule that a negligence action abates upon the death of 
78 This is Kramer's solution to the unprovided-for case if one does not take into account 
the effect of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The Clause has been interpreted as 
putting on states a "norm of comity" that prohibits them from discriminating against non-
residents simply because they are from outside the state. Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 
U.S. 656, 660-61 (1975). Kramer argues persuasively that it does not violate the Clause for 
Georgia to decline to extend its loss-allocating interspousal immunity rule to a California 
couple who get into an accident in Georgia, even if the result is that the California 
defendant-wife is disadvantaged. See supra note 60. In such a false conflict, Georgia is 
yielding to California interests, thereby reducing the friction that the Clause was intended 
to prevent. But (assuming that Ontario is subject to the Clause), he argues that it would 
violate the Clause for an Ontario court to use only its negligence law in Neumeier, without 
the affirmative defense, thereby disadvantaging the New York defendant. In that case, it 
cannot be understood as yielding to New York interests, because New York has no interest 
in its law applying to the case. Kramer, supra note 2, at 1072-74. The Clause therefore 
compels Ontario to extend its guest statute to the facts in Neumeier. For a criticism of 
Kramer's po,sition on the effect of the Clause, see Roosevelt, supra note 3, at 2520-25. For 
my part, I think worries about the Clause must be fundamentally reformulated once we 
recognize that New York has an interest in a rule barring liability being used. See 
Conclusion, infra. I hope to pursue these matters in another article. 
79 264 P.2d 944 (Cal. 1953). 
80 In the original Grant case, the parties were both Californians and the accident was in 
Arizona. Currie described this case as a false conflict. Only California has an interest. The 
California Supreme Court, in a sense, agreed, for it used California law. But rather than 
relying on interest analysis it argued disingenuously that the abatement rule was 
procedural. Grant, 264 P.2d at 948; Lea Brilmayer, Governmental Interest Analysis: A 
House Without Foundations, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 459, 468 (1985); CURRIE, supra note 26, at 
152; Kramer, supra note 2, at 1054-55. 
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the tortfeasor. California has abrogated its abatement rule by 
statute.81 
The purpose behind Arizona's abatement rule is the unfairness 
of compromising the property interests of the beneficiaries of an 
estate due to the wrongdoing of the deceased. The beneficiaries, 
after all, did no wrong themselves.82 Arizona is not interested, 
however, in this rule applying, because the estate to be protected 
is Californian. 83 
The purpose behind California law, in which an estate can be 
sued for the negligence of the decedent, is compensation to the 
plaintiff.84 California isn't interested in its law applying, because 
the plaintiff to be compensated is from Arizona. 85 Since neither 
jurisdiction's law applies, Currie argued that a court should use 
forum law.86 
Under Kramer's analysis, the Grant variation is a false conflict. 
Arizona negligence law without the abatement rule applies. 87 The 
abatement rule is an affirmative defense to an otherwise available 
negligence action. Because the abatement rule is intended to 
protect Arizona estates, it displaces Arizona negligence law only in 
suits against such estates. Since the estate is Californian in the 
Grant variation, the plaintiff is free to sue under Arizona 
negligence law. 
B. NO-CAUSE-OF-ACTION CASES 
So far, Kramer has addressed two unprovided-for cases. In each, 
an affirmative defense that would otherwise bar the plaintiff's 
action is inapplicable on conflicts grounds. But what happens when 
81 CAL. Crv. CODE § 956 (repealed 1961). The rule is now in California's code of civil 
procedure. CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE§ 377.20. 
82 CURRIE, supra note 26, at 144; Kramer, supra note 2, at 1048-49. Kramer questions 
whether this account is accurate, id. at 1048-49 n.21, but that need not concern us here. 
83 Arizona might still be interested if the beneficiaries of the California estate were 
Arizona residents. But in the Grant variation, they are Californians. 
84 Kramer, supra note 2, at 1049. It arguably also exists to deter negligent conduct, but 
any added deterrent effect due to one's beneficiaries' not receiving their inheritance after 
one's death is probably minimal. 
85 CURRIE, supra note 26, at 144-45. 
86 Id. at 156, 168. 
87 Again, this solution ignores the effect of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. See 
supra note 78. 
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the plaintiffs action is barred, not through an affirmative defense, 
but by the absence of a cause of action for relief? 
Kramer's example of an unprovided-for case of this no-cause-of-
action variety is Erwin v. Thomas. 88 Erwin, a Washington 
resident, was harmed in Washington by Thomas, an Oregon 
resident. Erwin's wife sued Thomas in Oregon state court for loss 
of consortium. Washington had retained the common law (and 
now unconstitutional) rule that only husbands can sue for loss of 
consortium. Oregon had abrogated the rule by statute. 
The Oregon Supreme Court treated the case as unprovided-for. 
As the court saw it, Washington law protects Washington 
defendants against loss of consortium actions by married women. 
It is therefore inapplicable in cases in which the defendant is from 
Oregon.89 But, the court concluded, Oregon law also is 
inapplicable.90 Because Oregon law exists to ensure adequate 
compensation to Oregon married women (and, perhaps, to 
maximize deterrence of negligence in Oregon), it does not apply 
when the plaintiff is from Washington and the accident occurred 
there.91 Following Currie's recommendation, the court used forum 
(that is, Oregon) law and allowed the Washington wife to recover.92 
The Oregon Supreme Court appeared to treat the Washington 
bar on loss of consortium actions by wives as if it were a 
defendant-protective affirmative defense to a general rule of 
liability. So understood, Kramer's response would be the same as 
in Neumeier and the Grant variation. Because the defense does 
not apply, the Washington plaintiff should be free to sue under 
Washington negligence law. But Kramer argues that the 
plaintiffs action in Erwin should instead be dismissed under 
Washington law for failure to state a claim. The reason 
Washington law does not provide married women with a cause of 
action for loss of consortium is because Washington lawmakers do 
not consider compensation to be appropriate at all: 
88 506 P.2d 494 (Or. 1973). 
89 Id. at 496--97. 
9o Id. at 497. 
91 Id. at 496--97. 
92 Kramer, supra note 2, at 1063. 
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A husband could recover for loss of consortium at 
common law, because the defendant's negligence 
deprived him of services his wife owed him by law. A 
wife could not make a similar claim when her husband 
was injured, because her husband did not owe her 
similar services. Thus, a wife's claim for loss of 
consortium does not fail because her interest in being 
compensated is subordinated to some interest of the 
defendant. It fails because she is not deemed to have 
suffered any injury.93 
Because Washington lawmakers do not consider a wife's loss of 
consortium to be a compensable injury, they would want the 
Washington wife in Erwin to be denied relief. She fails to state a 
claim under Washington law. 
To sum up, there are two types of unprovided-for case. Under 
cases of the first type, the law of the plaintiffs residence has an 
affirmative defense barring an otherwise applicable cause of action 
for recovery. The solution is that the inapplicability of the 
affirmative defense on conflicts grounds leaves the plaintiff free to 
recover. There is no gap in the law. The plaintiff has a cause of 
action under the law of her residence. 
Under cases of the second type, the law of the plaintiffs 
residence bars her action because it has no cause of action for 
recovery at all. The solution here is that the plaintiff fails to state 
a claim under her law. Again, there is no gap. The unprovided-for 
case is a "myth." 
IV. THE MYTH OF THE MYTH 
Kramer's solution to the unprovided-for case is ingenious but 
flawed. My focus will be on his solution to affirmative-defense 
unprovided-for cases, where the problem is his unsustainably 
93 Id. at 1062; see also Roosevelt, supra note 59, at 512 (accepting Kramer's argument); 
Roosevelt, supra note 3, at 2522 (same). Once again, this is the solution without taking into 
account the effect of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. See Kramer, supra note 2, at 
1073, for a discussion of the effect of the Privileges & Immunities Clause on no-cause-of-
action unprovided-for cases. For a discussion of the effect of the Clause on affirmative-
defense unprovided-for cases, see note 78 supra. I ignore this aspect of his argument here. 
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broad conception of a law. This conception generates intractable 
puzzles if applied consistently. I will then briefly discuss his 
solution to no-cause-of-action unprovided-for cases. 
A. AFFIRMATIVE-DEFENSE CASES 
As we have seen, Kramer argues that in Neumeier and the 
Grant variation, the affirmative defense that would normally 
displace the plaintiffs cause of action does not apply.94 That frees 
the plaintiff to recover. The point is not that regulatory policies 
recommend creating a law allowing the plaintiff to recover. There 
already is such a law. 
1. New True Conflicts. Let us take Kramer at his word. There 
is preexisting Ontario law allowing negligence actions against non-
Ontario hosts. And there is preexisting Arizona law allowing 
negligence actions against non-Arizona estates. 
If these laws already exist, they exist whatever the content of the 
competing jurisdiction's law. If a jurisdiction has a law on the 
books, it is on the books. It doesn't appear or disappear based on 
what the law of another jurisdiction says. Consider, therefore, the 
Grant variation with one change. There still is an Arizona 
plaintiff, a California estate, and an Arizona accident. Arizona still 
has the common law abatement rule. But the twist is that 
California has the abatement rule too. Both Arizona and 
California have retained the common law rule that a plaintiffs 
action for negligence abates upon the death of the tortfeasor. 
Kramer must characterize this case as a true conflict. As in the 
Grant variation, Arizona's negligence law (minus its abatement 
rule) applies. But now California also has an interest in the case-
its abatement rule applies, because there is a California estate to 
protect. So we have Arizona law giving the plaintiff a right of 
recovery and California law barring the plaintiffs action. 
But no court facing such a case would treat it as a true conflict. 
It would dismiss the plaintiffs action on the ground that both 
jurisdictions have law that bars the plaintiffs action. If the 
plaintiff started talking about Arizona negligence law providing 
him with a right of compensation against non-Arizona estates, he 
94 See supra Part III.A. 
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would be laughed out of court,95 or at best interpreted as asking 
the court to recognize a new and highly problematic Arizona cause 
of action, one that could never have been anticipated in advance of 
the conflicts case. 
To his credit, Kramer recognizes this problem and offers a 
response (albeit briefly and in a footnote): 
[T]he justification for Arizona to limit its abatement 
rule to Arizona estates is to leave other states free to 
regulate their estates as they see fit. But it would 
hardly be reasonable for Arizona to withhold the 
benefit of its abatement rule in deference to the law of 
the defendant's home state and then to ignore that 
state's law. Failure to recognize either Arizona's or 
California's abatement rule would thus be inconsistent 
with the premise for limiting the application of 
Arizona law in the first place.96 
One problem with this argument is that it fails to capture why 
an appeal to Arizona negligence law would be considered 
inappropriate. If the plaintiff said Arizona negligence law allowed 
him to sue non-Arizona estates, the court would say that no such 
law exists. It would not say that the law exists but is barred by 
California's abatement rule. 
But, more fundamentally, it is hard to see how Kramer's 
argument is responsive to the problem at all. It is indeed true that 
Arizona limits its abatement rule to Arizona estates to leave other 
states to regulate their estates as they see fit. 97 In the Grant 
variation, it gives the matter over to California. And California 
has chosen to act, by creating an abatement rule. But that simply 
means there is a true conflict. Deference to California's interests 
gives Arizona a reason not to extend its abatement rule to the 
facts. It does not give Arizona a reason not to extend its negligence 
95 One reason that the court would reject such a law is that it violates the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause. The law discriminates on the basis of the residence of the parties. But 
even in the absence of the Clause, no court would recognize the law's existence, because no 
one could have anticipated it in advance of the conflicts case. 
96 Kramer, supra note 2, at 1054-55 n.34. 
97 See id. at 1054. 
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law to the facts. As Kramer himself argues, Arizona is interested 
in its negligence law applying because there is an Arizona plaintiff 
who deserves compensation.98 How can the fact that Arizona has 
left the regulation of California estates to California mean that it 
has to prefer California's regulation of those estates to its own 
regulation of Arizona plaintiffs? The idea behind Kramer's 
argument appears to be that if both Arizona's negligence law and 
California's abatement rule apply, the case is not a true conflict, 
but rather a case in which a cause of action (Arizona's) has been 
defeated by an affirmative defense (California's). But that simply 
means Kramer has assumed-without argument-that California 
interests defeat Arizona interests.99 
I think the conclusion is inescapable: If Arizona really has a law 
allowing negligence actions against non-Arizona estates, then it has 
that law no matter the content of another jurisdiction's law. That 
means recognizing ''laws" that no one would ever say exist-in part 
because they would frustrate the expectations of the parties. 
We can now appreciate the attractions of Currie's approach, 
under which Arizona's abatement rule completely displaces 
negligence actions against estates.l0° For Currie, there simply is 
no Arizona negligence action against a California estate. Thus, we 
do not have to worry about an Arizona plaintiff asserting such a 
98 See id. (stating that "Arizona gives a right to recover to plaintiffs injured by negligent 
defendants" when the plaintiff is "from Arizona"). 
99 There is another problem with Kramer's argument. If he has solved the puzzle of a 
case in which both Arizona and California have abatement rules, he has done so only at the 
cost of making the original Grant variation an unprovided-for case again. In connection 
with that case, Kramer said that Arizona's negligence law gives the plaintiff relief. Arizona 
negligence law applies because the plaintiff is an Arizonan, and its abatement rule does not 
apply because the decedent is a Californian. That was the end of the story. Now things are 
more complicated. We cannot yet say whether the plaintiff can recover, because Arizona 
gives over to California law the question of whether an abatement rule is available. The 
problem is that California has no interest in its answer to that question being used in the 
Grant variation. California does not have an abatement rule because it prefers the 
compensatory interest of the plaintiff. But in the Grant variation, California has no 
compensatory interest because the plaintiff is not from California. So we are back to an 
unprovided-for case. Previously, the unprovided-for case was put this way: Arizona was not 
interested in its abatement rule applying, and California was not interested in its 
negligence law applying. Now, the problem should be put this way: Arizona is not 
interested in its abatement rule applying, and California is not interested in its reason not 
to have an abatement rule applying. 
1oo See Part liLA supra. 
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cause of action when both Arizona and California have abatement 
rules. But, as we have seen, Currie's approach violates the core 
thesis of interest analysis-that the scope of a law should be read 
in the light of its purposes. The scope of Arizona's abatement rule 
is read formalistically, not purposively. The rule displaces 
negligence liability against an estate even in cases in which 
Arizona has no interest in its doing so. 
Interest analysts therefore appear to face a dilemma. On the 
one hand, they can stick to the core thesis of interest analysis and 
understand the conflicts scope of an affirmative defense in the 
light of its purposes, with the uncomfortable result that laws exist 
whose application would upset the reasonable expectations of the 
parties. This is the path Kramer takes. On the other hand, they 
can abandon the core thesis of interest analysis and protect the 
reasonable expectations of the parties. This is Currie's approach. 
Interest analysts face this dilemma because they are committed 
to the view that laws have a scope in conflicts cases-that they can 
actually apply to the facts. This forces them to take a stand on 
how the conflicts scope of an affirmative defense should be read-
formalistically, as Currie argues, or purposively, as Kramer 
argues. But why think that Arizona negligence law and the 
Arizona abatement rule have any scope in a conflicts case? When 
Arizona lawmakers came up with these laws, they were thinking 
of an all-Arizona case. In such a case, protecting the blameless 
beneficiaries of an Arizona estate was considered more important 
than compensation to an Arizona plaintiff. Arizona law 
effectuating this balancing of interests is inapplicable to the facts 
of the Grant variation, for there are no beneficiaries of an Arizona 
estate to protect. One must figure out what law Arizona 
lawmakers would want to be created for the case. 
Once one understands law as made rather than applied in the 
Grant variation, a court is free to consider both regulatory policies 
and concerns about the expectations of the parties. True, 
Arizona's interest in compensation to an Arizona plaintiff 
recommends a negligence rule. But would the beneficiaries of the 
California estate be unfairly surprised by such a rule? In the 
Grant variation, the answer is no, because they would be similarly 
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exposed in an all-California case. So an Arizona negligence rule 
can be created for the case.l01 But party expectations are a 
problem if California also has an abatement rule. For that reason, 
it might be advisable (or even constitutionally obligatory on due 
process grounds) to create an abatement rule for the case, Arizona 
regulatory interests notwithstanding. 102 
Kramer, by contrast, cannot take party expectations into 
account in this way, because he thinks an Arizona law allowing 
negligence actions against California estates already exists. If it 
already exists, party expectations should conform to it, rather than 
the other way around. 
2. Rump Laws. One can describe the laws that Kramer argues 
apply in Neumeier and the Grant variation as rump laws. Instead 
of Ontario's guest statute's completely displacing negligence 
actions in guest-host cases, the guest statute displaces such 
actions only when the host is from Ontario. A rump Ontario 
negligence action in guest-host cases remains to be applied in 
Neumeier. A similar Arizona rump law applies in the Grant 
variation. 
Kramer finds rump laws useful in Neumeier and the Grant 
variation. But his approach produces other rump laws that he 
would find less congenial. If reading affirmative defenses in the 
light of their purposes generates rump laws, rump laws should 
also be generated when a law is repealed. 
Consider California's abrogation of its common law abatement 
rule in 1949. When California had an abatement rule, it 
101 I am not taking into account here the effect of any constitutional restrictions. It is 
likely that the creation of an Arizona negligence law for the Grant variation is prohibited 
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, because Arizona law discriminates on the 
basis of the residence of the parties. The proper rule to create, given the Clause, would 
arguably be one that takes into account all relevant state interests. This would include 
California's interest in protecting the blameless beneficiaries of a California estate. See 
Conclusion, infra (describing such an approach). 
102 There is nothing unusual about party expectations trumping regulatory policies when 
creating new common law rules. This occurs, for example, when federal courts create 
federal common law. Sometimes the content of the federal rule is borrowed from state law, 
because party expectations have coalesced around the state law standard. This can happen 
even if federal regulatory policies, narrowly construed, recommend a different rule. Kamen 
v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98-99 (1991); Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The 
Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 958-59 (1986) (offering DeSylva v. 
Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956), as an example). 
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presumably served the same purpose as Arizona's: protecting the 
property interests of the blameless beneficiaries of an estate. It 
applied, therefore, only in cases where the decedent was a 
Californian. When California lawmakers abrogated the rule, their 
purpose, we can assume, was vindicating the compensatory 
interests of plaintiffs. By Kramer's reasoning, therefore, the 
abatement rule was abrogated only for cases where the plaintiff is 
a Californian. A rump abatement rule still exists for cases (like 
the Grant variation) with a California estate and a foreign 
plaintiff. Such cases are within the scope of the original 
abatement rule and yet not within the scope of the abrogating 
statute. In short, Kramer should have characterized the Grant 
variation as a true conflict. Arizona's rump negligence law 
applies, and California's rump abatement rule applies. 
The fact that interest analysis, if applied consistently to 
repeals, would generate rump laws has been observed by Lea 
Brilmayer-although she does not notice that rump laws would 
also arise when laws are limited through affirmative defenses. 103 
As she puts it, the notion that a repeal of a law leaves a rump law 
in place is "absurd."104 Interest analysts "would agree that the 
territorial reach of the repeal must be identical to the territorial 
reach of the original statute."105 To avoid the problem of rump 
laws, she argues, the conflicts scope of a repeal must be read 
formalistically. But if that's so, she asks, why not read the 
conflicts scope of the law that is repealed formalistically too?106 If 
1oa Brilmayer, supra note 42, at 417-20. 
104 Id. at 418. She does not say why, but the reason is probably the frustration of the 
expectations of the parties if the existence of such a law were taken seriously. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 420. To my knowledge, the only writer to have responded to Brilmayer's challenge 
is Herma Hill Kay. (The example Kay discusses is a jurisdiction's repeal of a guest statute.) 
Kay argues that the repeal would not leave a rump guest statute in place, because the repeal 
was the repudiation of worries about fraud entirely: ''If a state changes the content of its 
domestic tort law respecting the recovery of guests against hosts, no remnant of an earlier 
protectionist policy for hosts survives to be resurrected in a conflicts suit by a nonresident 
passenger against a local driver." Herma Hill Kay, Testing the Modern Critics against Moffatt 
Hancock's Choice of Law Theories, 73 CAL. L. REV. 525, 539-40 (1985). 
Kay is quite right that if the repeal is understood as disclaiming any worry about fraud 
in guest-host suits, we have no reason to think that a rump guest statute remains. But the 
question remains why we should read the repeal in the manner she suggests. Ontario 
repealed its guest statute in 1977. Ont. Stat. ch. 54, § 16 (1977). Why read this as the 
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the conflicts scope of the repeal of the abatement rule is not read 
in the light of its purposes, why read the conflicts scope of the 
abatement rule itself in the light of its purposes? 
Brilmayer confronts interest analysts with the same dilemma I 
discussed earlier: (1) read the conflicts scope of law B, which limits 
law A, in the light of law B's purposes and accept that a rump of 
law A remains, or (2) read the conflicts scope of law B 
formalistically and violate the core thesis of interest analysis. But, 
to repeat, there is a third option. The dilemma does not arise if A 
and B do not apply in conflicts cases at all. If California's 
abatement rule has no conflicts scope, we don't have to speculate 
about the conflicts scope of its repeal. 
Once we stop thinking of rump laws as laws, we can appreciate 
them for what they really are: freestanding regulatory policies that 
recommend the creation of a new law for conflicts cases. So 
understood, rump laws are no longer absurd, but reveal very 
important truths. When Arizona's abatement rule was created, 
Arizona kept the policy of compensating harmed Arizonans. This 
policy did not disappear simply because it was overridden by 
concerns about fairness to the beneficiaries of Arizona estates. 
Because it did not disappear, it can recommend the creation of a 
rule of negligence liability in the Grant variation, where concerns 
about fairness to the beneficiaries of Arizona estates are 
irrelevant. By the same token, when California abrogated its 
abatement rule, its worries about fairness to the beneficiaries of 
California estates remained. This policy did not disappear simply 
because it was overridden by the desire to compensate harmed 
Californians. Because it did not disappear, it can recommend an 
abatement rule for the facts of the Grant variation, where concerns 
about compensating harmed Californians are irrelevant. 
3. Formalism. There is yet another problem with Kramer's 
solution to affirmative-defense unprovided-for cases. Too much 
repudiation of concerns about fraud in guest-host suits? Kay herself would admit that 
Ontario lawmakers are still concerned about collusive suits. There are other Ontario laws 
that sanction or discourage it. Insurance Act, R.S.O., 1990 c. !.8 (Ont.). Are we really to 
believe that Ontario lawmakers, despite expressing a concern about insurance fraud in 
other areas of Ontario law, and thinking in the past that preventing such fraud was more 
important than compensation and deterrence in guest-host cases, now have absolutely no 
concern about fraud in such cases? I cannot see how that can possibly be true. 
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rests on legal form. As Kramer describes it, if there is an 
affirmative defense blocking the plaintiff's recovery, the defense is 
inapplicable on conflicts grounds and the plaintiff's action can 
proceed.l07 If the plaintiff's recovery is blocked by the absence of a 
cause of action for relief, by contrast, the plaintiff fails to state a 
claim and his action is dismissed. 
This will not do. Imagine that Ontario legislators still think 
that worries about insurance fraud are more important than 
compensation and deterrence in guest-host cases. But instead of 
making the presence of a guest-host relationship an affirmative 
defense to a negligence suit, they decide to make the absence of a 
guest-host relationship an element of a cause of action for 
negligence. Kramer's formalism would apparently force him to say 
that an Ontario guest in a case like Neumeier (with a New York 
host and Ontario accident) now cannot recover. The case would 
have to be treated like Erwin. The plaintiff's action would be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim under Ontario law. 
But it should not matter to the analysis what form Ontario 
legislators chose to block guest-host suits, provided that they think 
that compensation to guests and deterrence of negligence by hosts 
are worthy goals, albeit goals that are less important than 
avoiding insurance fraud in an all-Ontario case. When Ontario 
lawmakers were choosing between redefining a negligence action 
and creating an affirmative defense, they were not thinking of the 
consequences of their choice for conflicts cases. They were focused 
on an all-Ontario case, where the distinction made a difference 
only to pleading and proof. 
To avoid such arbitrary results, Kramer would have to amend 
his argument to make the choice of legal form irrelevant. What is 
important is whether Ontario lawmakers, if asked, would say that 
Ontario has deterrence and compensatory policies that recommend 
liability of negligent hosts to guests. If they would say this, the 
plaintiff should be allowed to recover in Neumeier. 
But that means that it does not really matter in Neumeier 
whether one can point to a preexisting Ontario law allowing 
negligence actions against hosts. If no such law can be found, an 
101 See supra Part liLA. 
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appropriate Ontario negligence law must be createdJ08 And with 
that he has abandoned the view that only interests supported by 
preexisting laws count. The consequences for interest analysis if 
this position is abandoned are, as we shall later see, catastrophic.l09 
B. NO-CAUSE-OF-ACTION CASES 
Let us now briefly turn to Kramer's argument concernmg no-
cause-of-action unprovided-for cases. To repeat, Kramer argues 
that in these cases the plaintiffs action should be dismissed for 
failure to state a claim under the law of the plaintiffs residence.l10 
The wife in Erwin fails to state a claim under Washington law. 
The case is a false conflict. 
One problem with this solution is formalism again: Kramer relies 
too much on the fact that the plaintiffs action is blocked through 
the definition of a cause of action, rather than an affirmative 
defense. Assume that Ontario legislators see no purpose to 
compensation and deterrence in guest-host suits, not even a purpose 
that is trumped by worries about fraud. The special circumstances 
of guest-host suits make compensation and deterrence entirely 
inappropriate. Perhaps the guest, by demanding compensation, is 
ws AB Kramer has put it to me privately, even if there is no Ontario law allowing guests to 
sue hosts for negligence, the policies of Ontario lawmakers can show whether there is a 
legal right to compensation in guest-host negligence cases. Thus, Kramer would argue that 
this hypothetical Ontario negligence cause of action (which includes the absence of a guest-
host relationship as an element) really consists of two legal rights: a right of plaintiffs to 
compensation from all negligent defendants (even hosts), and an immunity right barring 
negligence actions if the defendant is a host. The immunity right trumps the compensatory 
right in an all-Ontario case. When the plaintiff-guest is an Ontarian and the defendant-
host a New Yorker, however, the compensatory right extends to the facts, and the immunity 
right does not. 
I would begin by noting that, in his article, Kramer speaks of there being no legal right 
without enacted law establishing it. Kramer, supra note 2, at 1064. In any event, I see no 
work that is being performed by the term "legal right" here. What Kramer is really doing is 
pointing to freestanding regulatory policies that recommend creating a new law for the facts in 
Neumeier. Kramer can speak of an Ontario "legal right" of an Ontario guest to compensation 
if he wants, but only if he also acknowledges a New York "legal right" of a New York host to 
have actions against him barred due to worries about fraud. See Conclusion, infra. Neumeier 
involves a true conflict between these two "legal rights." In both cases, the source of the 
putative legal right is the same-policies that are not supported by applicable law but that 
recommend the creation of a law for the facts of a conflicts case. 
109 See Conclusion, infra. 
no See supra Part III.B. 
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biting the hand that feeds him and simple self-interest (and worries 
about liability to third parties) will provide all the deterrence of 
negligence that the host needs.l11 Their response might be to 
redefine a negligence action, such that guest-host suits are not 
allowed. But they might instead pass a guest statute. Which 
approach they choose should not make a difference to Kramer's 
conclusion that the plaintiffs action should be dismissed for failure 
to state a claim in a case, like Neumeier, with an Ontario plaintiff, a 
New York defendant, and a New York accident. 
But there is an even more significant problem with Kramer's 
solution to the no-cause-of-action unprovided-for case. It assumes 
that the loss-allocating rule of the plaintiffs residence burdens the 
plaintiff. It is for this reason that the Washington wife fails to state 
a claim under Washington law in Erwin. This is contrary to the 
pro-resident presumption, which Kramer employs elsewhere,l12 
I think that part of the problem is that in Erwin, there is a 
particular reason why Washington would want its loss-allocating 
rule to burden Washington wife-plaintiffs. The justification for 
Washington's rule is that a wife has no right to the sexual services 
of her husband. When her husband has been rendered unable to 
provide those services, the wife has not lost anything to which she 
was legally entitled. She therefore deserves no compensation. 
Given this justification, Washington lawmakers would want the 
rule to apply to Washington wife-plaintiffs, because Washington, 
being the location of the marital domicile, has regulatory power 
over who in the relationship has a legal right to sexual services 
from whom. 
Furthermore, Washington lawmakers would not want the rule 
to protect Washington defendants. If an Oregon wife sued a 
Washingtonian for loss of consortium due to an accident in Oregon, 
the case would be a false conflict, not a true one. Washington 
lawmakers would not want their rule to apply, because they leave 
to Oregon lawmakers the determination of whether an Oregon 
wife has lost something compensable. This is very different from 
most loss-allocating rules blocking or limiting liability, like the 
111 These are not implausible positions. See, e.g., Perdue, supra note 42, at 1256 
(concluding that liability is not necessary to deter negligence of hosts to guests in car). 
n2 Kramer, supra note 2, at 1054-55. 
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damages limitation in Hurtado, where there is no special reason to 
think that the rule is intended solely to burden resident plaintiffs. 
It should either be read as benefiting resident defendants, in 
keeping with the pro-resident presumption, or as burdening 
resident plaintiffs and benefiting resident defendants equally, as 
the critics of interest analysis argue. 
To adequately assess Kramer's solution to no-cause-of-action 
unprovided-for cases, therefore, we need to consider a case without 
the special reason in Erwin to extend the loss-allocating rule of the 
plaintiffs residence only to resident plaintiffs. An example would 
be an unprovided-for version of Hurtado.l 13 To repeat, in the 
original Hurtado case, a family from Zacatecas sued a Californian 
for wrongful death due to an accident in California in which a 
Zacatecan was killed. Zacatecan law had a limit on the amount of 
damages for wrongful death (which was apparently part of the 
cause of action, not an affirmative defense); California law had no 
such limit. To make the case unprovided-for, we need to keep the 
residence of the parties the same but move the location of the 
accident to Zacatecas. 
Normally an interest analyst, using the pro-resident 
presumption, would argue that both jurisdictions lack an interest in 
the question of compensation above the Zacatecan limit. California 
lawmakers are not interested in ensuring that Zacatecans are fully 
compensated. And Zacatecan lawmakers are not interested in 
protecting Californians against "exaggerated claims."114 
If Kramer were to follow his argument in Erwin, he would say 
that the Zacatecan limit applies. Because the Zacatecan plaintiffs 
failed to state a claim for damages beyond the limit, Zacatecan law 
denies them relief. Zacatecan lawmakers are not just interested in 
protecting Zacatecans against paying excessive compensation-
they are also interested in making sure that Zacatecans do not 
demand excessive compensation. Again, there is no unprovided-for 
case. The case is a false conflict in which Zacatecan law applies. 
So understood, Kramer's solution to no-cause-of-action 
unprovided-for cases is puzzling. His argument is similar to the 
11s 522 P.2d 666 (Cal. 1974). 
114 Id. at 670. 
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critics' solution to unprovided-for cases, in which loss-allocating 
rules are read as burdening as well as benefiting residents. But 
Kramer's abandonment of the pro-resident presumption is 
strangely limited. Zacatecas is interested in burdening Zacatecan 
plaintiffs with its law. But California is apparently not interested 
in burdening California defendants with its law. Why not? If the 
fact that a cause of action does not recognize damages can 
disadvantage a resident plaintiff, why wouldn't the fact that a 
cause of action does recognize damages disadvantage a resident 
defendant? To be consistent, Kramer would have to characterize 
the Hurtado variation as a true conflict: California's unlimited 
damages rule and Zacatecas's damages limitation both apply. 
What's more, if one starts reading loss-allocating causes of 
action as burdening as well as benefiting residents, why not do the 
same thing to loss-allocating affirmative defenses? Arizona, for 
example, believes that it is inappropriate for a plaintiff to demand 
compensation from the blameless beneficiaries of an estate.l15 
That's why it has an abatement rule. Why wouldn't it want this 
defense to burden an Arizona plaintiff who makes demands on the 
blameless beneficiaries of a California estate? The Grant variation 
would turn out to be a true conflict: Arizona's abatement rule 
would burden the Arizona plaintiff, and California's negligence 
rule would burden the California defendant. 
Kramer appears to be in a bind. To provide an answer to the 
Hurtado variation, he must abandon the pro-resident 
presumption. But if he does so consistently, not only does the 
number of true conflicts balloon, his solution to affirmative-defense 
unprovided-for cases is threatened. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Let us set aside Kramer's solution to no-cause-of-action 
unprovided-for cases, and return to affirmative-defense 
unprovided-for cases.l16 I think it is clear that Kramer's attempt 
115 See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text. 
116 I hope to discuss no-cause-of-action unprovided-for cases-and more generally, how 
failure to state a claim should be treated in the conflict of laws-more fully in a separate 
article. 
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to find preexisting law that applies in such cases is unsuccessful. 
Nevertheless, he has identified important regulatory policies that 
recommend creating a new legal rule to fill the gap that the 
unprovided-for case creates. Kramer is right that Ontario 
lawmakers would want a rule of negligence liability for the facts in 
Neumeier. Such a rule would compensate Ontario guests and 
deter negligence by hosts in Ontario. Granted, Ontario lawmakers 
concluded that these policies are not as important as avoiding 
insurance fraud. But they were thinking about cases where the 
host is from Ontario, such that the consequences of the fraud 
would be felt there. When the host is not an Ontarian, the 
importance of compensation and deterrence should indeed rise to 
the fore, even though there is no actual Ontario law allowing 
guest-host negligence suits that supports these policies.l17 
Does that mean that a court faced with the facts of Neumeier 
should allow the plaintiffs action to proceed? The problem is that 
if one is allowed to look beyond preexisting laws to identify 
relevant regulatory policies, there is no reason to stop with 
Ontario's interests in compensation and deterrence. 
For example, New York has an interest in avoiding insurance 
fraud. 118 Granted, it does not have a guest statute. But, as we 
have seen, Ontario does not have a law allowing negligence 
liability in guest-host suits either. We have abandoned the dogma 
117 Something like this argument has been offered by Robert Sedler. See Sedler, supra 
note 54, at 144; Robert A. Sedler, The Governmental Interest Approach to Choice of Law: An 
Analysis and a Reformulation, 25 UCLA L. REV. 181, 235-36 (1977); see also Hans W. 
Baade, The Case of the Disinterested Two States: Neumeier v. Kuehner, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
150, 167 (1973) (offering an argument similar to Sedler's). As Sedler would put it, in 
Neumeier, Ontario and New York have shared policies of deterring negligent driving and 
compensating those harmed by such driving. Ontario, however, has a law-the guest 
statute-that deviates from the shared policies. Sedler argues that a court should decide 
the case in accordance with the shared policies, because Ontario has no interest in applying 
the law that deviates from them. The Ontario plaintiff should be allowed to recover. 
Kramer has criticized Sedler's argument, which is similar to his own in other respects, 
for talking about "state interests in the abstract," without identifying the law under which 
the Ontario plaintiff recovers. Kramer, supra note 2, at 1056. As Kramer sees it, the 
Ontario plaintiff recovers under Ontario negligence law. Sedler, by contrast, appears to be 
suggesting that law be created to vindicate shared policies. But it is precisely in speaking of 
the Ontario plaintiff suing under preexisting Ontario law that Kramer went wrong. 
118 New York has laws that sanction such fraud and keep those who engage in it from 
retaining the proceeds. N.Y. INS. LAW§§ 401-410 (McKinney 2011). 
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that only the purposes of preexisting laws count. We should 
therefore conclude that New York's policy of preventing insurance 
fraud recommends a rule that bars liability against New York 
hosts for the facts in Neumeier. 
It is true, of course, that New York lawmakers think that 
compensation to guests and deterrence of negligence by hosts are 
more important than worries about insurance fraud. Otherwise, 
they would have enacted a guest statute. But in refusing to enact 
a guest statute, they were thinking about cases where the 
compensation was to New York guests and the deterrence was of 
negligence in New York. When the compensation would be to 
Ontario guests and the deterrence would be of negligence in 
Ontario, worries about fraud by New York hosts should rise to the 
fore. 
In short, what's good for the Ontario goose is good for the New 
York gander. If a court facing the facts in Neumeier is free to 
apply a novel Ontario law allowing guest-host negligence suits, it 
must also be free to apply a novel New York law that bars liability 
against hosts-a virtual New York guest statute. 
So far, I have spoken of two new laws that might be applied in 
Neumeier. One is a rule of negligence liability that serves 
Ontario's interests. Another is a rule barring liability that serves 
New York's interests. But there is a third option. A court might 
choose a rule that best serves the aggregate weighted interests of 
Ontario and New York in the case. It would do so by balancing 
Ontario's interests in compensation to Ontario guests and 
deterrence of negligence by hosts in Ontario (both of which argue 
for a liability rule) against New York's interest in discouraging 
fraud concerning New York insurance contracts (which argues for 
a rule barring liability),119 
Of course, we have no idea what the result of that balancing is 
likely to be. We cannot assume that the result would be Kramer's 
recommendation of negligence liability. Assume that the Ontario 
legislature assigned the following weights to the competing 
policies, using utiles (an arbitrary measure of relative strength of 
119 One benefit of this approach is that it would avoid constitutional objections that the 
court is jiggering the content of the law to benefit its residents in violation of the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause. 
804 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:763 
preference).120 It gave compensation to Ontario guests a value of 3 
utiles, deterrence of negligent hosts in Ontario a value of 1, and 
discouraging fraud by Ontario hosts a value of 5. As a result, it 
concluded that a guest statute was appropriate: Comp.ont (3) + 
Deter.ont (1) < Fraudont (5). The New York legislature, for its part, 
gave compensation to New York guests a value of 2 utiles, 
deterrence of negligent hosts in New York a value of 4, and 
discouraging fraud by New York hosts a value of 5. As a result, it 
chose not to enact a guest statute: Comp.NY (2) + Deter.NY (4) > 
FraudNY (5).121 The proper rule for Neumeier would be a rule 
barring liability, contrary to Kramer's recommendation: Comp.ont 
(3) + Deter.ont (1) < FraudNY (5) .122 
We can now see why Currie and Kramer insist that 
governmental interests be limited to those supported by preexisting 
laws. Once the door is opened to freestanding regulatory policies, 
there is no way to answer the unprovided-for case at all. 
But it gets worse. These freestanding regulatory policies are 
relevant not just in unprovided-for cases, but in all conflicts cases. 
Consider Babcock u. Jackson, 123 in which the New York Court of 
Appeals first abandoned vested rights theory for interest analysis. 
Babcock involved a New York guest, a New York host, and an 
accident in Ontario. The court read the case as a false conflict. 
Ontario was not interested in its guest statute applying, because 
the host was not from Ontario. New York, by contrast, was 
interested in its negligence law (in its loss-allocating function) 
applying, because that would ensure adequate compensation for a 
New York guestJ24 
But this ignores the freestanding Ontario and New York 
regulatory policies that our analysis of Neumeier has revealed. If 
these policies are relevant in Neumeier, they should be relevant in 
120 ROBIN WEST, NORMATIVE JURISPRUDENCE: AN INTRODUCTION 98-100 (2011). 
121 This assumes that we have solved the problem of interjurisdictional utility 
comparisons. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
122 To make matters worse, there is no reason to think that the only relevant New York 
policy in favor of a rule barring liability is a worry about insurance fraud. 
12a 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963). 
124 See id. at 284 ("Comparison of the relative 'contacts' and 'interests' of New York and 
Ontario in this litigation ... makes it clear that the concern of New York is unquestionably 
the greater and more direct and that the interest of Ontario is at best minimal."). 
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Babcock. Put in the mix, Ontario is interested after all. Ontario 
lawmakers would want a guest-host negligence rule as a means of 
deterring negligence by hosts within the province. As for New 
York lawmakers, we don't really know what rule they would want. 
True, they have a reason to want a guest-host negligence rule as a 
means of compensating a New York guest. But there is also the 
worry about fraud by the New York host. This worry was 
insufficient to recommend a guest statute when it was up against 
compensation and deterrence. But we do not know what New 
York lawmakers would say when the worry about fraud is up 
against compensation alone. We cannot conclude they would 
choose a rule of negligence liability. Using the assignment of 
weights to policies described above, they would want a virtual 
guest statute: Comp.NY (2) < FraudNY (5). 
We also do not know what rule best serves the aggregate 
weighted interests of Ontario and New York, which would require 
comparing the strength of Ontario's deterrence interest plus New 
York's compensatory interest (both of which argue for negligence 
liability) against the strength of New York's interest in 
discouraging insurance fraud (which argues for a virtual guest 
statute). We cannot assume that the balancing would recommend 
a rule of negligence liability. Using the assignment of weights to 
policies described above, the proper rule would be a virtual guest 
statute: Comp.NY (2) + Deter.ont (1) < FraudNY (5). 
The analysis is complex, but the upshot is simple. As interest 
analysts recognize, laws are enacted without considering conflicts 
cases. But interest analysts still insist that these laws apply in 
conflicts cases. They are mistaken. The decisions that lawmakers 
made about the relative weights of policies in non-conflicts cases 
cannot tell us what rule those lawmakers would want for conflicts 
cases. The problem is clearest in the unprovided-for case, because 
only policies that stood against currently existing laws are 
relevant. But these sacrificed policies are relevant in other 
conflicts cases too.l25 Because the balance of regulatory policies in 
125 The only exception would be a true conflict in which all of the reasons for each 
jurisdiction's law are implicated. An example would be a case with a New York guest, an 
Ontario host, and a New York accident. New York is interested because there is a New York 
guest to compensate and negligence by a host in New York to deter. Ontario is interested 
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a conflicts case is fundamentally different from the balance in a 
non-conflicts case, existing law is inapplicable. Courts must make 
law. And if they are to make law on the basis of relevant 
regulatory policies, they must consider all policies-not just those 
standing behind enacted laws.l26 That is the lesson of the 
unprovided-for case. 
But how can a court possibly figure out what law serves 
governmental policies, when doing so requires considering not 
merely the policies standing behind existing laws, but also the 
policies standing against those laws-policies that are unlikely to 
have been mentioned by the relevant lawmakers? I think the 
answer is that it cannot, and that interest analysis must be 
abandoned. The considerations are so complex that trying to 
identify the proper balance of governmental interests probably does 
not get us sufficiently close to the correct solution to be worth it. 127 
Under the pressure of the unprovided-for case, interest analysis 
collapses, leaving no clear choice-of-law approach in its place. 
because there is an Ontario host whose possibly collusive suit would have negative financial 
consequences for the province. In such a case, a court would not need to consider the policies 
that New York and Ontario lawmakers sacrificed when enacting their laws. 
126 I am not the first conflicts scholar to have characterized courts as making law in conflicts 
cases. From the American legal realists to Friedrich Juenger to Lea Brilmayer, this has been 
a minority (and somewhat disreputable) position in the field. E.g., WALTER WHEELER COOK, 
THE LoGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 20-21 (1942) ("[T]he forum, when 
confronted by a case involving foreign elements, always applies its own law to the case, but in 
doing so adopts and enforces as its own law a rule of decision identical, or at least highly 
similar though not identical, in scope with a rule of decision found in the system of law in force 
in another state or country with which some or all of the foreign elements are connected .... "); 
FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 163-69 (1993); Lea 
Brilmayer, The Problem of Provenance: The Proper Place of Ethical Reasoning in Selection of 
Applicable Law, in THE ROLE OF ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 101 (Donald Earl 
Childress III ed., 2012) (discussing what she calls the "common-law method" in choice of law). 
But I arrive at this position, I believe, for novel reasons. 
127 This is particularly true if the goal is coming up with the rule that best serves the 
aggregate weighted interests of all relevant jurisdictions-a goal that I think would be 
necessary to avoid any Privileges and Immunities argument that the court is creating law 
that discriminates on the basis of residence. 
